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Background: The events of 9/11 and the October 2002 National Intelligence
Estimate on Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction precipitated
fundamental changes within the United States Intelligence Community. As part of
the reform, analytic tradecraft standards were revised and codified into a policy
document – Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203 – and an analytic ombudsman
was appointed in the newly created Office for the Director of National Intelligence to
ensure compliance across the intelligence community. In this paper we investigate the
untested assumption that the ICD203 criteria can facilitate reliable evaluations of analytic
products.
Methods: Fifteen independent raters used a rubric based on the ICD203 criteria
to assess the quality of reasoning of 64 analytical reports generated in response to
hypothetical intelligence problems. We calculated the intra-class correlation coefficients
for single and group-aggregated assessments.
Results: Despite general training and rater calibration, the reliability of individual
assessments was poor. However, aggregate ratings showed good to excellent reliability.
Conclusion: Given that real problems will be more difficult and complex than our
hypothetical case studies, we advise that groups of at least three raters are required to
obtain reliable quality control procedures for intelligence products. Our study sets limits
on assessment reliability and provides a basis for further evaluation of the predictive
validity of intelligence reports generated in compliance with the tradecraft standards.
Keywords: intelligence analysis, intelligence failures, intelligence reform, IRTPA, ICD203, ODNI, tradecraft
standards, inter-rater reliability
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INTRODUCTION
In a seminal article on the role of intelligence analysis, Betts
wrote that “the role of intelligence is to extract certainty from
uncertainty and to facilitate coherent decision in an incoherent
environment” (Betts, 1978, p. 69). In other words, the role of
intelligence analysis is to reduce (but not necessarily eliminate, see
Heazle, 2010; Marrin, 2012) and caveat uncertainty (Friedman
and Zeckhauser, 2012) to improve national security policy.
However, in the wake of perceived intelligence failures such as
predicting the 9/11 attacks (National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States, 2004, but also see Zegart,
2005, 2006) and Iraq’s capability of deploying weapons of mass
destruction (The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities
of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction,
2005, but also see Phythian, 2006), the intelligence community’s
(IC) ability to help policy makers manage uncertainty was
criticized. In consequence, the United States Congress passed
sweeping reforms in the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act (IRTPA), demanding, among other things, the
adoption of analytic tradecraft standards to improve the quality of
reasoning and argumentation in intelligence products. Moreover
IRTPA mandated the creation of an ombudsman for analytic
integrity to ensure “finished intelligence products produced [. . .]
are timely, objective, independent of political considerations,
based upon all sources of available intelligence, and employ the
standards of proper analytic tradecraft” (IRTPA, 2004, Section
1019a, our emphasis).
In response, the Director of National Intelligence signed
Intelligence Community Directive [ICD] 203 (2007/2015),
specifying four analytic standards: objectivity, political
independence, timeliness, and good tradecraft. The latter
further identifies nine elements of analytic tradecraft: (1)
Properly describes quality and credibility of underlying
sources, data, and methodologies; (2) Properly expresses and
explains uncertainties associated with major analytic judgments;
(3) Properly distinguishes between underlying intelligence
information and analysts’ assumptions and judgments; (4)
Incorporates analysis of alternatives; (5) Demonstrates customer
relevance and addresses implications; (6) Uses clear and logical
argumentation; (7) Explains change to or consistency of analytic
judgments; (8) Makes accurate judgments and assessments; and
(9) Incorporates effective visual information where appropriate.
To ensure compliance with these standards, an office for Analytic
Integrity and Standards (AIS) was established in the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence.
Nevertheless, the belief that compliance with these standards
would improve analysis and reduce uncertainty has been
challenged from two directions. First, it has been claimed
the tradecraft standards in ICD203 add nothing new to the
existing practice (Lowenthal, 2012; Marchio, 2014; Gentry, 2015),
and second, that reports complying with these standards may
not produce more accurate estimates (Tetlock and Mellers,
2011). In this paper we investigate a third, more fundamental,
issue that has so far received very little attention: whether
the tradecraft standards can be reliably applied; that is, will
two (or more) assessors evaluating the same report reach the
same conclusions regarding its quality? (see Marcoci et al.,
2018).
There is reason to be concerned. First, research into the design
and implementation of assessment standards and requirements
in higher education show consistently that standards expressed
in linguistic terms are “fuzzy” and subject to multiple
interpretations even by experienced evaluators (Sadler, 1987;
Freeman and Lewis, 1998; Webster et al., 2000; O’donovan et al.,
2004). ICD203 shares many of the characteristics of assessment
standards in higher education.
Second, individual expert judgments in many related fields
are routinely insufficiently reliable for practical applications.
The reliability of judgments about facts and future events
correlates poorly or not at all with the personal attributes that
conventionally are associated with an expert’s credibility such as
qualifications, years of experience, memberships, publications,
or the esteem in which they are held by their peers. Cooke
(1991) was one of the first to explore the ramifications of
expert uncertainty for safety systems in engineering. Since that
seminal work, hundreds of publications in spheres ranging from
medicine and ecology to safety engineering and geoscience have
documented the difficulties of identifying the attributes of reliable
raters and the benefits of using group judgments to improve
reliability (Burgman, 2015).
We could not find any evidence of attempts to identify the best
assessors of analytic products or any research into the impact of
training on their performance. To our knowledge, the reliability
of the analytic tradecraft standards has not been systematically
assessed. Yet, the question of reliability logically precedes
investigation about its construct validity (do the standards really
capture good quality of reasoning?), and predictive validity (does
a good report make accurate predictions about the state of the
world?). If the standards are not construed and used in the
same way by different users, then the question of whether they
engender more accurate estimates becomes moot. In this paper
we report on the results of an experiment gauging the reliability
with which the tradecraft standards in ICD203 can be applied. As
noted above, ICD203 is meant to direct both the production and
evaluation of analytic reports for quality control. For purposes of
this experiment we focus on the latter aspect of ICD203.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
We recruited 15 participants through an advertisement posted
on the University of Melbourne’s School of Historical and
Philosophical Studies mailing list. Selection criteria included: (1)
completed or currently enrolled in a research higher degree in
Arts/Humanities, (2) experience marking essays, (3) interest in
the study and availability/willingness to work under imposed
time constraints. Participants were selected from a pool of
applicants based on best fit to the selection criteria, and were
remunerated for their time. Seven were male, seven female
and one preferred not to specify. Their average age was 35.93
(SD = 9.14) years. Seven had completed either a Masters or a PhD
in the Humanities, while the rest were current PhD candidates.
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Materials and Procedures
This study draws on materials developed in the Crowdsourcing
Evidence, Argumentation, Thinking and Evaluation (CREATE)
program, an active research program (2017–2020) run by the
Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA).
Reports
Participants (henceforth: “raters”) were asked to evaluate the
quality of reasoning of a set of hypothetical intelligence reports.
The reports were generated by another group of research
participants involved in testing a new online collaborative
reasoning platform developed at the University of Melbourne,
Australia, as part of the CREATE program. This platform
(described in van Gelder and de Rozario, 2017), aims to (a)
use the power of distributed processing within a network of
individual thinkers, and (b) improve reasoning quality and the
aggregation of solutions into a final, agreed solution. Users on the
platform are requested to write individual analytical reports that
outline the outcome (the solution to the problem) and the process
(the underlying reasoning). They are invited to comment on one
another’s contributions and update their own contribution in
response to comments. The platform also encourages users to rate
others’ solutions and the average quality rating (on a scale 0–100)
determines the rank of each solution. The top-rated solution
becomes the template for a final draft report, which is edited and
ultimately submitted as a team report.
We collected 64 such reports generated by both individual
users and teams in response to four different reasoning problems.
All problems emulated reasoning challenges in real intelligence
problems, with the exception that the problems were self-
contained, i.e., all necessary information for solving them
was contained in the problem description and the contextual
information provided. Reports were generated during “beta-
testing” of the platform in late 2017; test users included
platform developer team members, junior analysts from an
intelligence organization and individuals recruited online via
targeted Facebook advertising. For the purposes of the current
study, reports were downloaded from the platform and formats
retained apart from minor changes such as removing specific
references to and comments on other users’ submissions, so that
each report could be analyzed as a stand-alone item. An example
problem and report are provided in Supplementary Material.
The number of reports included in this study was determined
prior to data collection. Given our knowledge of the internal
procedure in AIS, we decided to measure the inter-rater (rather
than intra-rater) reliability of the tradecraft standards using
intra-class correlations (ICC). As the precision of ICC estimates
depends on the number of raters, the number of reports and
the true ICC, the numbers of included raters and reports were
determined a priori to ensure sufficient precision (i.e., narrow
confidence intervals) in our estimates of the ICC following Bonett
(2002). With 64 products and 15 raters we were certain to have a
95% CI width (distance between the upper and lower bound) of
no larger than 0.19 for the average ICC, and only slightly wider
intervals in our estimates of the ICC for fewer raters (e.g., at worst
0.25 for estimating the ICC with four raters), regardless of the true
ICC (Bonett, 2002).
Quality of Reasoning Rubric
ICD203 outlines the standards for good reasoning in intelligence
analysis. These standards are operationalized by AIS in a
“Rating Scale for Evaluating Analytic Tradecraft Standards,” an
assessment rubric with nine criteria (Table 1). The rubric is
very detailed. Every criterion has a short explanation regarding
its scope. For example, “Criterion 4 – Incorporates analysis of
alternatives” gives a paragraph of explanation detailing what
it takes for a report to “incorporate analysis of alternatives.”
Further, every criterion includes a comprehensive description of
four levels of performance quality, i.e., “poor,” “fair,” “good,” and
“excellent,” except for criterion 7, which describes the quality of
judgments present in the report as either “unclear,” “conditioned,”
or “unconditioned.” Each level of performance contains detailed
sub-criteria that a report must meet to count as having satisfied
the criterion “up to that level.” Additionally, each criterion
contains a “Notes” section that gives detailed examples, tips, hints
and elements to “watch out for” when applying the rubric. These
three elements (high level explanation, sub-criteria for each level
of satisfaction, and the notes) sum to a detailed rubric.
For the purposes of this study, we omitted the criterion
“Explains change to or consistency of analytical judgments”
because it requires the report writer to have an understanding of
previous analyses, which is irrelevant for the kind of constrained
reasoning problems we used in this study. Furthermore, we
made a small number of minor textual changes to accommodate
the participants’ lack of familiarity with the jargon used in
the original document. Numeric values were assigned to each
performance level (i.e., 0 for “poor,” 1 for “fair,” 2 for “good,” and
3 for “excellent,” except for criterion 7, where 0 was awarded for
“unclear,” 1 for “conditioned” and 2 for “unconditioned”). Scores
were summed to give a total mark out of 31 for each report.
Procedures
All raters completed the rating of the 64 reports over the
course of 4 working days, in supervised sessions held at
Melbourne University. This allowed us to mitigate the risk of
non-independent evaluation, manage rater fatigue, ensure that
raters understood the instructions, and that each report was
TABLE 1 | Criteria used for assessing quality of reasoning in the rating scale for
evaluating analytic tradecraft standards.
Criterion Description
1 Properly describes quality and credibility of underlying sources,
data, and methodologies
2 Properly expresses and explains uncertainties associated with
major analytic judgments
3 Properly distinguishes between underlying intelligence
information and authors’ assumptions and judgments
4 Incorporates analysis of alternatives
5 Demonstrates relevance and addresses implications
6 Uses clear and logical argumentation
7 Makes accurate judgments and assessments
8 Incorporates effective visual information where appropriate
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marked in full. Compliance with instructions was monitored by
one of the authors (AK).
The rating process started with a 2-h training/calibration
exercise led by one of the authors (AK). First, raters were
given the Rating Scale to peruse, make notes and ask questions
regarding anything that was unclear or ambiguous. Second,
raters were given a copy of a sample hypothetical intelligence
problem (not included in the experiment, but also drawn from
the CREATE program) and again encouraged to peruse it and
ask questions. Next, raters were split into five groups of three
and asked to evaluate a sample report individually at first and
then deliberate in their group to reach a consensus on its
evaluation using the Rating Scale. Afterward, groups shared their
evaluations, followed by a robust discussion that highlighted
differences in the way each group had interpreted the rubric
criteria. Through facilitated discussion, differences were resolved
and raters reached a consensus on an interpretation of how
the criteria should be applied. They repeated this process for
another two sample reports on the same hypothetical intelligence
problem. Finally, the group was given one last sample report
to mark as individuals and the facilitator assessed whether the
group was sufficiently calibrated. At the end of this process, raters
appeared to have reached a shared praxis or understanding of
how to apply the rubric to the types of reports they would be
evaluating. Each rater was then presented with a bound book
containing the 64 reports in randomized order to eliminate order
effects. Raters indicated their assessments on a personal score
sheet, and were instructed not to discuss the reports, the rubric
or the ratings with each other (data collected is summarized in
the Supplementary Material).
Upon completion of the 64 report ratings, we obtained
feedback from the raters on their experience with the rubric, and
how they thought it performed as an assessment tool of quality of
reasoning. All participants completed a questionnaire consisting
of 10 open-ended and 10 multiple-choice questions, and took part
in a focus group session (3 h). Both the survey and the focus
group explored what the raters thought did and did not work well,
which criteria were difficult to apply and why, whether there were
elements of good or bad reasoning that were not captured by the
rubric, the user-friendliness of the rubric, and their confidence in
applying the rubric for the assessment of reasoning quality (see
Supplementary Material, Table 3 for the full list of questions).
Analysis
Rubric Reliability
The AIS quality control procedure involves multiple assessors
concurrently evaluating products on the basis of ICD203.
This motivated the use of the inter-rater reliability as our
primary metric for rating consistency. Inter-rater reliability of
the summed total scores for each report was assessed via ICC,
a commonly used metric for the reproducibility or “consistency”
of quantitative measurements made by different observers rating
the same object(s). ICC values lie between 0.0 and 1.0, with higher
values corresponding to greater agreement between raters.
First, we used the IRR package in R to calculate ICC values
using a Two-Way Random-Effects Model, which assumes that
each object is rated by a different set of raters who were randomly
chosen from a larger population of possible raters. The ICC
value we report here reflects absolute agreement rather than
simple consistency between raters. We report both the “average”
ICC value and the “single” ICC value, which differ in their
interpretation. Their use depends on how the measurement
protocol will be conducted in actual application. The “single”
ICC is an index for the reliability of the ratings of single raters;
the “average” ICC is an index for the reliability of different
raters averaged together. The latter always results in higher ICC
estimates. If in future use of the rubric, the average value across
a number of raters is used as the assessment basis, the relevant
reliability metric would be the “average” ICC. Conversely, if in
future applications of the rubric, a single rater conducts the
actual assessment, the “single” ICC type is the relevant reportable
metric, even though the reliability study involves two or more
raters. Regardless of the type of ICC, values <0.40 indicate poor
inter-rater agreement, between 0.40 and 0.59 fair agreement,
between 0.60 and 0.74 good agreement and >0.75 excellent
agreement (Cicchetti, 1994).
Second, we examined the internal consistency of the eight
criteria that make up the rubric with Cronbach’s Alpha. We also
assessed item-total correlations to examine which (if any) criteria
showed poor consistency with the rest of the rubric. Criteria with
poor item-total correlations should be considered for removal
from the rubric as they compromise reliability.
Rater Feedback
Results from the rater survey were summarized with descriptive
statistics by one of the authors (BW). With regard to the focus
group, two of the authors (AK, MM) independently coded the
transcript and extracted the main themes. The resulting themes
were reviewed by four authors (AK, AM, AV, and MM) to ensure
that each theme was internally coherent, themes were distinct,
and to reach consensus on their naming and interpretation.
RESULTS
Inter-Rater Reliability
We calculated the ICC value for groups of raters of varying
size. We first examined the “average ICC” metric for groups of
between 2 and 15 raters. The “average ICC” provides a valuable
estimate of reliability if future applications of the rubric involve
aggregated evaluations, that is, if multiple raters are tasked with
assessing single reports and their scores are averaged to produce
a final quality assessment.
To ensure reliability of our findings, we iterated over all
possible subsets of each given group size n, and report the average
ICC values for each n. We found an increase in reliability with
increasing numbers of raters, starting from fair reliability with
n = 2 raters [ICC = 0.498, 95% bootstrap CI = (0.196, 0.799)] to
close to perfect reliability [ICC = 0.897, 95% CI = (0.846, 0.936)]
when n = 15 raters were included (Figure 1). However, even
a small set of three raters produces borderline good reliability
[ICC = 0.608, 95% bootstrap CI = (0.416, 0.800)]. On the other
hand, the “single ICC” metric produces an estimate of the
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FIGURE 1 | Relationship between number of raters and the Intra-Class Correlation (ICC), using either components 1–8 of the rubric, or only components 1–7. For
n = 1 rater, the ICC estimate is based on an estimate of “single ICC” as calculated by the IRR package, using data from all 15 raters. For n = 2 to n = 15, to obtain
the most precise estimates, we calculated the “average ICC” for all subsets of raters of size n, and took the mean. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. For n = 1
and n = 15, the 95% confidence interval was calculated by the IRR package when estimating the ICC value. For n = 2 to n = 14, the confidence intervals are 95%
bootstrap intervals over the subsets of raters.
reliability of a scale if just one rater scored it on a single occasion.
Accordingly, this value does not depend on number of raters in
the group, and we find that based on the 15 available raters, the
single ICC value was poor [ICC = 0.366, 95% CI = (0.268, 0.495)].
Removing criterion 8 (“Incorporates effective visual
information where appropriate”) from the overall score
calculation improved the ICC values almost as much as doubling
the number of raters (For example, using the complete rubric,
three raters have an ICC of 0.608. Using six raters would improve
the ICC to 0.768, whereas keeping only three raters but dropping
criterion 8 improves the ICC to 0.759).
We also assessed the inter-rater reliability for individual
criteria. The average ICC for 15 raters was excellent for all but
criterion 8. The single ICC value for 15 raters, however, was poor
to fair across the criteria (Figure 2). For a detailed analysis of
the ICC values for all possible group sizes, see Supplementary
Material (Figure 3).
Internal Consistency
We calculated Cronbach’s Alpha separately for each of the 64
reports. The average value of Alpha across all reports was
0.606, which is considered “questionable” internal consistency.
To examine which of the criteria might be responsible for
the low consistency, we conducted an item-total correlation
analysis (Table 2). This revealed that criteria 7 (“Makes accurate
judgments and assessments”) and use 8 showed little correlation
with the remaining items, and that removing them would
improve the internal consistency of the rubric, with Alpha = 0.64
and 0.66, respectively. Rerunning the internal consistency
analysis with both items seven and eight removed, revealed
that this increased the internal consistency across all reports to
“acceptable,” Alpha = 0.71.
The removal of criterion 8 in particular appears to be
defensible as the inter-rater reliability for this criterion was very
low, and it was identified in our qualitative analysis as neither
critical to “good reasoning” nor transparent in its application, at
least with reference to the specific set of test reasoning problems
in this study (refer to Supplementary Material, Figure 4 for
further details).
Qualitative Feedback
The results from the qualitative feedback reveal that some criteria
are ambiguous and provide insufficient guidance, allowing for
potential discrepancies in interpretation. Moreover, some criteria
lack specificity, that is, raters perceived areas of overlap such that
judgments on some criteria depended on and were affected by
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FIGURE 2 | Intra-class correlation coefficients for each of the criteria of the assessment rubric based, with 95% confidence intervals.
others. Some criteria, in particular 1 (“Properly describes quality
and credibility of underlying sources, data, and methodologies”)
and 2 (“Properly expresses and explains uncertainties associated
with major analytic judgments”), were also considered to describe
multiple distinct attributes, potentially leading to conflation of
reasoning faults in the overall assessment.
The following themes emerged as the key points of concern
regarding the rubric used in this experiment. Illustrative verbatim
quotes from the transcript are included for each theme:
1. “Box-ticking.” In applying the rubric, marks are assigned
for the presence of certain attributes rather than on the
actual quality or effectiveness of these elements.
“But if Y provides what we would think would be very weak evidence
for the truth of X then for a certain kind of box ticker that arguably
TABLE 2 | Item-total correlations for the eight criteria, and estimated Alpha values
if the criterion were removed from the rubric.
Criterion Item-total correlation Cronbach’s Alpha, if deleted
Criterion 1 0.41 0.58
Criterion 2 0.46 0.57
Criterion 3 0.51 0.56
Criterion 4 0.38 0.59
Criterion 5 0.40 0.57
Criterion 6 0.53 0.55
Criterion 7 0.19 0.64
Criterion 8 0.09 0.66
would be enough to qualify it as good but for someone who’s perhaps
more quality minded and perhaps is arguably inclined to go beyond
the rubric they might say - no that counts as poor.”
“And I felt it rewarded just putting headings and separating
information. It gave too much value to just distinguishing when it
was done very blatantly and not very well.”
2. “Granularity.” Descriptions for the different levels of
satisfaction for a given criterion were not precise enough
to enable clear categorization between poor-fair-good-
excellent.
“I often had trouble distinguishing between fair and good . . . I
wanted a third option in between cause they might provide say
1 sentence that’s obviously little detail but if they go into 3 or 4
sentences I wouldn’t call it considerable but you have to go one or
the other.”
3. “Specificity.” Some criteria were too dense and measured
multiple attributes at once (that may diverge in a single
report). This may also have led to perceived overlap
between criteria.
“. . . I found that reports that did perform in the excellent category
in criterion 3 usually automatically perform well in criterion 4 as
well because the two things kind of go together.”
4. “Logical consistency.” A number of comments identified
logical inconsistencies, or a lack of overall coherence in the
criteria in how they addressed the overall goal of “good
reasoning.”
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FIGURE 3 | Raters’ evaluation of overall confidence in their report assessments (n = 13).
“. . . still scored really highly even though . . . wasn’t addressing the
question at all, because it presented a clear analytic message,. . . did
it really well, but it should be a problem if it’s not answering the
actual question.”
“. . . it’s a little bit inconsistent . . . in the notes it says you’re not
to rate reports on writing style or editorial practices. Seems a bit
contradictory. But also I do lot of work as an editor and I would
argue that writing style and editorial practices are connected to
clarity and logic of argument. The way you use words, punctuation
could change the meaning of a sentence.”
5. “Aggregation.” The rubric provides no detail on how
criterion scores are aggregated into a total score. Perceived
weighting of the different criteria influenced rater behavior
that may introduce inconsistency in the application of the
rubric.
“If you’re going to use rubrics you need to understand how each
criterion is weighted because some are literally more important than
others . . .. It kind of depends on what the actual goal is as to how
things are weighted.”
6. “Unfair penalization.” Raters felt forced to penalize a report
for “going the extra mile,” rather than rewarding some risk
taking.
“It’s confusing that if you say you make a claim about probability
and don’t explain it all you get fair whereas if you explain it
wrongly. . . you get penalized.”
Overall, raters reported being moderately confident in
their report assessments, with the majority being “fairly” or
“somewhat” confident (Figure 3).
When asked how useful (or not) the rubric is in helping to
separate quality of reasoning with quality of writing (n = 14),
eight found it to be “fairly useful” (57%), four found it to be
“somewhat useful” (29%), and two found it “only slightly useful”
(14%).
DISCUSSION
Our study clearly illustrates that the tradecraft standards and
their operationalization in the AIS rubric present “poor” inter-
rater reliability when deployed by individual raters and “good”
to “excellent” (when criterion 8 is excluded) inter-rater reliability
when deployed by groups of at least three raters. We expect
this will be true of reports of the kind used in this study: i.e.,
those that are relatively simple and self-contained. In contrast,
a group of 15 raters approaches perfect reliability. Therefore, our
results suggest that evaluations completed by a single assessor on
the basis of the tradecraft standards should be interpreted with
extreme caution. This study focused exclusively on the role of the
tradecraft standards in the evaluation of analytic reports. But the
low inter-rater reliability of the tradecraft standards when used by
single raters also raises in our minds concerns regarding their use
in the production of analytic reports.
Our findings further indicate that the criteria are not
sufficiently precise, are ambiguous, may not be exhaustive in
capturing the core elements of good reasoning, and may be
perceived by analysts as not applicable in the development of a
well-reasoned report. Users may also perceive the standards to
be emphasizing “process” over “deep quality.” The criteria should
therefore be revised to ensure that they are internally consistent
and that each addresses a single issue. Moreover, in the absence
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of knowledge on how the criteria scores will be aggregated, raters
may hold private and different weightings that influence their
assessments of the products. Similar concerns may arise in the
minds of the analysts who produce reports using ICD203. This
may lead to a focus on report attributes that are of limited
relevance to the overall quality or the accuracy of the analysis.
Further research is required to provide a comprehensive
evaluation of the success of IRTPA and ODNI/AIS in creating a
reliable and valid quality control process for the IC. This study is
a first step in that direction and has its limitations.
First, note that a group’s rating of a report consists in the
mathematical average of the individual ratings. This approach
cancels out disagreements. Another approach would be to
require discussion and/or third party moderating to resolve
disagreements on the application of the standards before
individual ratings are averaged. Whether such an approach would
raise the reliability of teams of evaluators (and by how much)
remains an open empirical question that we aim to address
in future research. And the potential for bias should not be
overlooked. Nevertheless, the fact that small (n = 3–4) teams
can apply the standards consistently (even when using simple
mathematical averaging) means teams of evaluators using the
current AIS operationalization of ICD203 can perform reliable
quality control.
Second, our raters were novices in the sense that they had
no prior experience in using either the tradecraft standards
or the AIS rubric. However, they had considerable experience
using assessment rubrics in higher education and assessing
written work, they were given training on the AIS rubric and
underwent a calibration exercise. Given the strong parallels
between rubrics in education and this one, there are no obvious
reasons to expect that novice professional raters would perform
appreciably better. Moreover, the literature on expertise teaches
us that the attributes of reliable evaluators are very elusive
(Burgman, 2015). So whether the results of the present study
would hold for senior assessors on real intelligence reports
remains an open (empirical) question. On the one hand, due
to experience, they may be more consistent in the application
of the standards. On the other, “real-world” (unconstrained)
intelligence problems and reports would be more difficult to
assess, and the impact of idiosyncratic understanding of the
standards of analysis and biases should not be underestimated. It
is unclear to us how to weigh these considerations a priori and
we hope to address the reliability of the standards with senior
assessors and on unconstrained intelligence problems in future
research.
Third, we should also note that, all other factors being equal,
ICC values are depressed when there is little variation in the
objects being rated. If reports used in this study were relatively
similar in quality, this would therefore impose an upper limit
to the achievable ICC. However, the reports represented a range
of products generated on the platform, by both individuals and
teams, and vary in sophistication and reasoning quality. This
was confirmed by examining the peer assessments produced by
contributors themselves using the optional rating functionality
on the platform. While only a subset of reports (N = 40) received
peer-ratings, the quality assessments ranged from 10 to 85 on
a 100-point scale (M = 57.4, SD = 14.45), suggesting sufficient
variation in quality for the purposes of ICC calculation. Future
evaluation of the tradecraft standards should nevertheless be
performed on a wide range of reports varying in style, purpose
and quality.
Furthermore, whether accurate quality control is possible
on these standards remains an important open question. Just
because averages of groups of three or more raters are consistent
does not mean that their assessments accurately capture the
true quality of reasoning. This is a matter of external validity.
Validity is dependent on reliability – an unreliable instrument
cannot make accurate measurements – hence, this study should
be considered a first step toward an investigation of the validity
of the tradecraft standards. But the matter of whether these
standards and the associated rubric used by AIS is actually a valid
indicator of quality of reasoning, and whether a report that rates
highly is also producing the “correct” results is one for future
study.
Finally, in-depth analysis of the 15 raters’ experience in
applying the rubric revealed potential leverage points to revise
the instrument with a view to increasing its internal consistency.
Some criteria were too prescriptive, described as a “box-ticking
exercise,” leading to frustration. Raters felt that if they complied
with the rubric, they were forced to unfairly penalize genuine,
though incomplete, analytical process, whereas the absence of
analytic effort was rewarded, comparatively. In a context where
analysts may already feel under pressure to align with a preferred
narrative (Stimson and Habeck, 2016), this may promote a
culture of conservative analytical approaches at the expense of
appropriate risk-taking, which may be detrimental to the overall
quality of reports.
Commenting on the intelligence reform brought about by
IRTPA, Robert Cardillo (2010), who served as the Deputy
Director of National Intelligence for Intelligence Integration,
wrote that ICD203 “injects rigor into our processes and products
and holds analysts and managers accountable for results” (2010:
44), i.e., by providing a tool for assessing the analytic products
they generate. The results of the present study suggest that this
optimism may be compromised when evaluations are undertaken
by single assessors, but that it may be vindicated by teams who
can consistently apply the tradecraft standards to evaluate the
quality of products generated by the IC.
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